Great statesman or unscrupulous opportunist? Anglo-Saxon interpretations of Lluís Companys by Preston, Paul
  
Paul Preston  
Great statesman or unscrupulous opportunist? 
: Anglo-Saxon interpretations of Lluís 
Companys 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: Preston, Paul (2015) Great statesman or unscrupulous opportunist?: Anglo-Saxon 
interpretations of Lluís Companys. Bulletin of Spanish Studies . pp. 1-17. ISSN 1475-3820 
 
 
DOI: 10.1080/14753820.2016.1106117 
 
 
© 2015 Bulletin of Spanish Studies 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65784/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other 
copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to 
facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of 
the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the 
URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you 
wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Great Statesman or Unscrupulous Opportunist?  Anglo-Saxon Interpretations of Lluís 
Companys. 
 
 Contemporary Anglo-Saxon views of Lluís Companys ranged across a spectrum 
from admiration of his statesmanship as leader of Catalonia to indignation at what was 
seen as his subordination to anarchists.  As might be expected, the admiration was usually 
found in the writings of observers, whether British or American, who had some 
knowledge of, and feeling for, Catalonia.  The most acerbic criticisms tended to derive 
from conservative diplomats, particularly the representatives of Great Britain.  Given that 
there were important British business concerns in Catalonia and about 1500 British 
citizens resident in Barcelona, it was hardly surprising that the principal British consulate 
in Spain should be located there.  In consequence, there exists an abundance of reports to 
the government in London about political developments in the region with many 
references to Companys.
1
   
 
 The British Ambassador from 1928 to the end of 1935, Sir George Grahame was 
a relatively liberal individual inclined to view the new Republican authorities with 
benevolence.  He admired both Manuel Azaña and Colonel Macià and was sympathetic 
to the movement towards a Catalan autonomy statute.
2
  Unfortunately, his tolerant 
attitudes were not shared by the Consul General in Barcelona, Norman King, a 
conservative born in 1880.  Sharing many of the patronising, if not downright racist, 
attitudes of British conservatives towards Spaniards in general, King soon revealed 
himself to be a hostile critic of the new Republic in general and specifically of 
developments in Catalonia.  Although he claimed on several occasions to enjoy the most 
cordial personal relations with Companys, King’s comments tended to be highly critical. 
 
 Inevitably, British diplomats felt considerable trepidation with regard to the 
Catalan situation after the anarchist insurrection in December 1932 and it was in this 
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context that their attitudes towards Companys would develop.  Sir George Grahame 
ended his report on those events with the comment ‘The lesson of this latest outbreak is 
that there still exists a danger to the State from the Extreme Left, and that a strong 
Government is indispensable if order is to be maintained and the security of existing 
institutions assured.’3  The doubts about the capacity of the Catalan authorities to control 
the subversive forces of the CNT were somewhat calmed by the relative ease with which 
the insurrectionary movement of December 1933 was quelled in the region.
4
  However, 
the death on 25 December 1933 of the President of the Generalitat, Francesc Macià, 
provoked considerable doubts within the British diplomatic community.  Sir George 
Grahame regarded Colonel Macià as a safe pair of hands and thought that his 
disappearance opened up a period of uncertainty, not least because of the lack of 
someone with the necessary skill, maturity and experience to be an obvious successor: 
‘His death is likely to complicate further the political situation in Catalonia, for there is 
no one particularly indicated to succeed him, and certainly no one possessing in the eyes 
of the Catalan people the nimbus which, in spite of the friction inevitably engendered by 
the exercise of power, encompassed untuk the end the venerable head of the first 
President of the Generalidad.’5  The assumption of power by Lluís Companys was merely 
reported by Sir George Grahame without comment.
6
 
 
 The dispute over the Llei de Contractes de Conreu, initially between the Esquerra 
and the Lliga, and subsequently between the Esquerra and the central government, saw 
the British government’s observers inclining to the side of Francesc Cambò.  From 
Madrid, Sir George Grahame tended to report events in a relatively neutral tone but 
Norman King in Barcelona was already beginning to reveal a more partisan approach to 
local politics.  On 8 June, the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees ruled that the Corts 
Catalanes did not have the power to legislate in the issue of Ley de Contratos.  Norman 
King explained clearly to the Ambassador why the decision of the Tribunal was 
perceived in Catalonia as an attempt to reduce the region’s autonomy.  However, he made 
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no secret of the fact that regarded as rash the decision of Companys to present the law 
unchanged to the Parlament de Catalunya.  Moreover, he considered Companys’s 
remarks to the effect that Catalonia would defend the Republic against monarchist 
reaction as ‘inflammatory’.  He went on to assert that the attitude of the Esquerra ‘might 
be compared to that of athletes who refuse to take part in any contest unless they are 
certain to win and who abandon the ring at the first unfavourable decision.’7  
 
 In contrast, the doyen of British Hispanists, Professor Edgar Allison Peers of the 
University of Liverpool, despite his own conservative views, regarded Companys with 
some admiration.  He described him as ‘an undistinguished-looking little man, who as a 
practising lawyer had had a good deal to do with the worker’s Unions and of whom the 
Anarco-Syndicalists had a way of speaking as if they owned him.  But he was an acute 
parliamentarian and an excellent organiser; and the first six months of the year 1934 
passed quite placidly.’8  As a frequent visitor to Catalonia, he took a different view.  
Peers realised, as did Companys, that not only the Llei de Contractes de Conreu, but also 
any realistic concept of Catalan autonomy, was under threat from the Confederación 
Española de Derechas Autónomas.  Essentially, Peers agreed with Companys who had 
declared in the Parlament de Catalunya on 12 June, ‘l’ocorregut amb aquesta Llei és 
solament un episodi en les relacions que el Govern ve sostenint des de fa temps ambs els 
últims Governs de la República.  L’ofensiva a les nostres llibertats s’ha anat produint 
cada dia des de tots els Ministeris amb milers d’incidències ocorregudes, i responen a una 
tàctica i una persistència de l’Estat, o més aviat de les influències monàrquiques que 
s’han apoderat de l’Estat.’9 
 
 Peers wrote in consequence: ‘As nearly as I could assess the opinion of the 
Catalonian in the street at that period, as distinct from that of the party politician and the 
revolutionary, it was distinctly on the side of Sr.Companys, not so much on the intrinsic 
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merits of the rabassaires’ case, but because it was felt that the Tribunal had acted in a 
high-handed way, and that, for the honour of Catalonia, Sr.Companys had made the only 
possible reply.’10  Although the government of Alejandro Lerroux was inclined to 
negotiate a compromise solution over the Llei de Contractes de Conreu, Catalan 
autonomy would be under threat if the CEDA joined the government.  The links between 
José María Gil Robles, the leader of the CEDA, and the Catalan right were reinforced 
when he spoke on 8 September at an assembly that the Catalan landowners’ federation, 
the Instituto Agrícola Catalán de San Isidro, organised in Madrid.   
 
 However, even Professor Peers was alarmed by the way in which Companys 
referred to the action of the central government as ‘l’agressió, dintre de la República, dels 
lacais de la Monarquia i de les hosts feixistes monàrquiques, que ja han fet penetrar llur 
avantguarda i que son ja a la mateixa porta’, talked of the eventual triumph of ‘la 
nacionalitat catalana’.11  Norman King’s much more critical attitude towards Companys 
soon moved towards outright hostility.  This was a consequence of the President’s 
reaction to the entry of the CEDA into the central government and his declaration on 6 
October 1934 of the Catalan State within the Federal Republic of Spain.  King’s views 
were clearly coloured by the right-wing company that he kept. He reported to the Foreign 
Office with regard to Azaña that ‘I had heard a report that he was conspiring with the 
Catalan Government to set up a new republic of which Catalonia should be the head, in 
case the Lerroux Government should attempt to establish martial law in this country.’  
King believed that Companys was not a separatist but that he had somehow fallen under 
the influence of Josep Dencàs.  His sympathies were revealed in his comment 
‘Fortunately, for the cause of law and order, the troops remained loyal, and there was no 
sign of the Catalan contingents from Tarrasa, Sabadell and other disaffected centres.’12   
 
 Even Peers believed that ‘the people of Catalonia had been betrayed by their own 
leaders’.  Neither he nor King perceived the extent to which Companys, already under 
immense pressure from the extreme nationalists of Estat Català, was also the victim of 
                                                 
10
 Peers, Catalonia Infelix, p.227. 
11
 Peers, Catalonia Infelix, p.228. 
12
 King to Simon, 7 October 1934, W9023/27/41, BDFA, Part II, Series F, vol.26, pp.166-7. 
provocation from Gil Robles.  The new cabinet contained three Cedistas, José Oriol y 
Anguera de Sojo (Labour), Rafael Aizpún (Justice) and Manuel Giménez Fernández 
(Agriculture).  Anguera de Sojo was a deliberately provocative choice.  As an extreme 
ultraist member of the Instituto Agricola Catalán de San Isidro, he was a bitter enemy of 
the Esquerra.  As a hard-line Civil Governor of Barcelona in 1931, his uncompromising 
strike-breaking policies had pushed the CNT towards insurrectionism.  The choice was 
consciously offensive, since Companys had sent a deputation to see Alcalá Zamora and 
plead for his exclusion.  Gil Robles had refused point-blank the suggestions of the 
President.
13
  Nevertheless, it is clear that, in the circumstances, the action of Companys 
was, to say the least, unrealistic if not downright irresponsible. 
 
 In the wake of the abortive federalist rebellion of 6 October, the critical attitude of 
Norman King was seconded by Sir George Grahame who made extremely unfavourable 
comparisons between the political stature of Companys and that of Francesc Macià.  On 
10 October 1934, he wrote:  ‘The rebellion of the Catalan Government, while 
synchronising with the general strike and the uprising of violent labour elements, and 
doubtless largely conditioned by these events, was purely political and probably due in 
the main to the personal character and attitude of Sr. Companys, President of the 
Generality. I had, as reported at the time, an interview with Sr. Companys in May last, 
when I was in Barcelona. He struck me as a supple and unscrupulous politician of a kind 
often found in Latin countries and quite the opposite of his predecessor, Sr. Macià, who 
was a straightforward and venerable Catalan full of ideals.  Sr. Companys spoke to me 
almost contemptuously of Sr. Azaña, saying that, though he was a competent President 
when he had in his hands the government of the country, he was not much good in 
Opposition, lacking initiative and being too philosophical, aloof and disdainful of 
antagonists. Sr. Companys appeared to pride himself on understanding how mass 
movements were to be managed and directed nowadays, and it struck me that he had been 
influenced by spectacular methods such as are prevalent in Italy and Germany. He 
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appeared to have a strong element of audacity and ambition in his composition.  Recent 
occurrences show what was lacking in him, namely, the power of computing the material 
force at his disposal and that which might be brought against him.’14 
 
 How different were the comments of the English Catholic correspondent of the 
Daily Chronicle, Henry Buckley.  He wrote ‘After two centuries and a quarter of 
oppression since Philip V abolished the regional autonomy at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, Catalonia had been free once again for only three short years since 
the Republic was proclaimed in 1931 and now Feudal Spain was again out to smash he 
independence.  The Catalans led in the October revolt, just as they did when the Republic 
was proclaimed in April 1931.  But this time it was a short affair.  Curiously enough 
almost the entire resistance was made by the middle class, that is to say by the Esquerra 
Catalana, the Liberal Party led by Luis Companys, and the Estat Català, the separatist 
movement which was working in cooperation with the former group. […]  Companys and 
the Esquerra stood for all that was Liberal and Left-Wing in Catalan and national politics 
and here they were co-operating with a group that was Fascist in tendency.’15 
  
 The consequence of Companys’s rash action was that the Catalan Parlament was 
closed, the Estatut suspended, the Llei de Contractes de Conreu annulled, Catalan-
language newspapers prohibited and control of law and order and labour affairs reverted 
to the Madrid government.  Over 3000 Catalans were still in prison at the beginning of 
1935.  In the course of his trial by the Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales, which 
began on 27 May and continued until 7 June 1935, in his final intervention, Companys 
declared: ‘En nombre propio, insisto en destacar mi mayor responsabilidad por los 
motives que ya ha expuesto mi defensor siguiendo mis isntrucciones.  Mis compañeros, 
por el afecto que me tienen, por la serendidad de su ánimo y por estímulos de elegancia 
spiritual, sienten satisfacción y tienen a honor el compartir e igualar su responsabilidad 
con la mía.  Pero a mí me produce una impression que me hace exclamar: esto señores 
del Tribunal, no sería justo.  Si hay un responsible, soy yo; o, cuando menos, tengo que 
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absorber la mayor parte de la responsabilidad.  Dicho esto, ahora, en nombre de todos, 
debo añadir lo siguiente: Afirmo por nuestro honor, porque es la verdad, ante el Tribunal, 
ante el país y ante la Historia, que el móvil de nuestras determinaciones no fué otro que la 
defensa de la República demócrata y parlamentaria y de las libertades que la Constitución 
del Estado tiene reconocidas a Cataluña.’16  Professor Peers regarded this speech as 
dignified and chivalrous, not least because he was convinced that Companys had been 
forced by Josep Dencàs and the Chief of Police, Miquel Badia, into what he called ‘a mad 
adventure’, his declaration of Catalan independence.  Peers was inclined to believe that 
Companys had made the declaration ‘against his will’, possibly even at pistol-point.17 
  
 The assault on Catalan liberties by the Radical-CEDA coalition inadvertently 
favoured both left-wing and nationalist groups in the parliamentary elections of 16 
February 1936.  In October 1935, Sir George Grahame was replaced by the considerably 
more right-wing Sir Henry Chilton.  Norman King revealed his own prejudices as well as 
confirming those of the new Ambassador, when he wrote: ‘The announcement of the 
result of the elections was followed by a tranquillity which was almost uncanny.  At such 
times, when the possibility of trouble is anticipated, the well-to-do classes seem to retire 
temporarily from the scene.  It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that in Spain when 
the Left lose an election, they refuse to “play the game” and threaten a revolution, 
whereas if the Left wins, the Rights run away.”  On the other hand, in the same report, he 
acknowledged that the punishment inflicted on Companys and the other Consellers of the 
Generalitat had significantly influenced the election results.  He wrote ‘The extraordinary 
popularity of Sr.Companys is due to his cordialidad popular – a term difficult to 
translate.  He made his reputation as the legal adviser of the Syndicalists, and in politics 
naturally became the champion of the rights of the workers.  He is astute and 
unscrupulous, and the best that I have ever heard said of him is that there are worse 
lawyers and politicians who are even more unscrupulous than he is.  His appearance does 
not belie his reputation, but he has a great gift of swaying the mob with his oratory.  He 
polled 260,990 votes, and the fact that so many votes should be given for him when he is 
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still in prison for having brought on a civil war is significant of the attitude of the masses.  
The fact that Sr.Companys by his defiance of Madrid, caused the Catalans to lose their 
autonomy temporarily is overlooked.  For them he is the successor of their hero Macià, 
and the champion of Catalan independence.  It is curious to reflect in this connexion that 
Companys was not himself a separatist, and in his cooler moments probably would have 
disapproved of the rash action in October 1934, into which he was hurried by Dencàs, 
Badia and other headstrongs.’18 
 
 The new British ambassador, Sir Henry Chilton, was a man of extremely 
conservative views.  Like the majority of officials in the Foreign Office, he regarded the 
Popular Front as a Trojan Horse in the service of the Comintern.  In response to the May 
Day celebrations in Madrid, he would comment on his ‘feeling that the weak and 
vacillating Spanish government had abandoned the power to the proletariat’.19  Chilton’s 
suspicious reaction to the return of Companys as President of the Generalitat was 
coloured by the hostile appreciation provided by Norman King who reported, in the most 
school-masterly tone: ‘There has been no disturbance of public order in connexion with 
the arrival of Sr.Companys, and it remains to be seen whether he and his fellow-ex-
prisoners have learned their lesson and will deal with the new situation in a spirit 
chastened by fifteen months’ imprisonment.  Their attitude and that of their adherents are 
not reassuring.  So far from showing any regret for the events of the 6
th
 October, which 
proved so disastrous to Catalonia and the rest of Spain, they obviously regard the date as 
a red-letter one in Catalan history.’20 
 
 Despite his antipathy towards Companys, King’s reports contributed to the idea 
that Catalonia constituted an oasis of tranquillity in the spring of 1936.  As late as early 
June, still pleased with the idea of Companys having been taught a lesson by 
imprisonment, King wrote to the British chargé d’affaires in Madrid, George Ogilvie-
Forbes: ‘Sr. Companys seems to be aware of the importance of the problems with which 
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he has to deal.  Although as the former legal champion of the syndicalists he has always 
been looked upon with great suspicion by the Conservatives and property owners, he 
appears to have broadened his views.  He has declared that he will uphold the law, 
maintain the right to work and prevent coercion and he is reported to have said recently 
“Better a dictator than communism”.  I am assured by an acquaintance of the President 
that it is not unlikely that Sr.Companys and the property-owning classes will make 
common cause against their enemies the anarchists and Communists.’21 
 
 The outbreak of war found Sir Henry Chilton on holiday in his splendid French 
residence in St Jean de Luz, where he remained until his retirement in late 1937.  Deeply 
hostile to the Republicans, to whom he normally referred as ‘the Reds’, Chilton 
maintained cordial relations with the military rebels on the other side of the border.  
British knowledge of Catalan politics was therefore left to Norman King, who 
communicated directly with the Foreign Office.  He made little effort to conceal the fact 
that he thoroughly approved of the military coup.  Having been recalled from his summer 
leave, shortly after arriving in Barcelona on the destroyer HMS London, he wrote: ‘The 
Government of Sr.Companys appears to be losing control.  They have sown the wind and 
are now reaping the whirlwind.  Sr.Companys himself is nothing more than a figure-head 
and he gives the impression, physically as well as figuratively, of being a rat caught in a 
trap.’  He went on to say that ‘My impression is, therefore, that the disasters of the last 
week are really only the first act of the tragedy.  Barcelona appears doomed to be the 
scene of further struggles and horrors whatever is the outcome of the general situation.  If 
the Government are successful in suppressing the military rebellion, Spain will be 
plunged into the chaos of some form of bolshevism and acts of savage brutality can be 
expected.’22 
 
 Initially, however, King made an effort to achieve some understanding of what 
exactly Companys was trying to do in dealing with the fact that the military coup had left 
political power in the streets which were it dominated by the CNT.  He wrote on 6 
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August: ‘In this confused imbroglio the Government of Sr. Companys are endeavouring 
to maintain a semblance of authority by working with the committees of the extremists.  
Commissioners of public food and public amusement [sic]. &c., have been nominated, 
presumably in imitation of the Russian system.  Sr. Companys told me personally that he 
hoped to find the solution of his difficulties by appointing a new Government and he has 
now delegated his authority as President of the Government to Sr. Casanovas, a popular 
Catalan figure, and he has included in the Cabinet several leaders of the extreme Left in 
the hope of reaching a working compromise and preventing the friction between the 
armed anarchists and the Government from coming to an open struggle.  The 
Government, of course, rely chiefly on the disciplined Civil Guards, of whom there are 
about 1,200 in Barcelona and 800 in the rest of Cataluña but these men, even with the 
Government's shock police and the anti-Fascist militia, do not dare to try to disarm the 
anarchists and the armed proletariat in the capital and the provinces.  A premature 
attempt might be fatal.  It has always been the nightmare of respectable Catalans that the 
“underworld” of the proletariat should break loose and obtain control and this they are 
now within an ace of doing.  Sr. Companys, therefore, must play for time by 
endeavouring to induce their leaders to work with him and making whatever concessions 
are necessary.’23  The enormous difficulties facing Companys in maintaining a working 
relationship with the CNT while also trying to restore law and order would enjoy King’s 
comprehension only for a short interlude. 
   
 King would soon be found insinuating that Companys was somehow to blame for 
the break-down of political authority, for the imminent establishment of a Soviet regime 
and for the atrocities perpetrated by uncontrolled elements and by the FAI, even claiming 
mendaciously that Companys had armed the workers before the military coup.  
‘Sr.Companys may not order or even approve the atrocities now taking place, but when 
one considers that he rose to power through the National Union of Workers [CNT], now 
allied to the anarchists, as the lawyer of which he made his reputation, and that his 
Government armed the anarchists prior to the outbreak of the present revolt, he cannot 
divest himself of his responsibility.’  Despite the efforts of Companys and the Generalitat 
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to control the disorders, King reported that ‘the control is slipping more and more out of 
the hands of Sr.Companys and the government of Sr.Casanovas into those of the anarcho-
syndicalists’.  He saw the situation as one of ‘bolshevistic anarchy’ and the government 
forces as a ‘collection of raw levies, young anarchists, escaped gaolbirds and other armed 
rabble, including a company of women’.  He also submitted the draft of a letter which he 
proposed to send to the Catalan government.  In it, he protested against ‘the state of 
anarchy which still prevails in the country under your governance’ and of ‘the atrocities 
committed by Spanish citizens on their fellow countrymen, some of which if true, and I 
have good reason to believe them, would disgrace the most backward race of savages 
known to humanity’.  The Foreign Office refused authorisation for his letter to be sent.24   
 
 The deterioration of King’s attitude towards Companys was fundamentally the 
result of his understandable outrage at the collectivisation of numerous British 
businesses, the violent requisition of the property, especially motor cars, of British 
citizens and the goods of British companies warehoused in the port of Barcelona.
25
  
These acts inflamed his intense antipathy to the anarchists.  His readiness to assume that 
this meant that bolshevism was taking over Catalonia may be read in many of his 
despatches.  In mid-August, King reported to London on a meeting with Joan 
Casanovas at which he protested about the requisitioning of cars and the opening of 
consular mail.  In the course of their encounter, during which King’s tone to the 
Catalan prime minister was extremely patronising and over-bearing, Casanovas 
said that ‘he was struggling to restore order amidst the confusion for which the late 
uprising was responsible.’  To this King replied brusquely that ‘to judge from the 
declarations of Sr. Companys, the order which the Catalan government was 
attempting to restore amounted to Bolshevism.’26  Most graphically, he wrote on 28 
August 1936 of the flying of the senyera catalana over Montjuich: ‘the Catalans (today 
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this word means the dregs of the population) consider that the hoisting of this flag is 
another step forward to Catalan independence’.27   
 
 What King seemed to have missed was that, far from being the mere puppet of the 
anarchists, Companys had realised that the Anti-Fascist Militia Committee was actually a 
great face-saving device for them given their lack of preparation for running a revolution, 
let alone a war, a perception which opened the way to the eventual recovery of 
governmental authority.  In fact, although it seemed as if the workers were in control, 
sufficiently to alarm King and other diplomatic representatives, the CNT had actually 
acquiesced in the Central Anti-fascist Militia Committee being simply a sub-committee 
of the Generalitat.  Companys had effectively ensured a continuity of state power even if 
it was temporarily in the background.  The presence in the Committee of both the 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya was a 
guarantee of this.  At the time, understandably, neither King nor his American colleagues, 
the U.S. Consuls General, Lynn W.Franklin and his successor Mahlon Fay Perkins, could 
see this.
28
  The PSUC was as committed as Companys and the Esquerra to taming the 
revolution.  Companys had manoeuvred the CNT into accepting responsibility without 
long-term institutionalized power.  It took some time before it occurred to the diplomatic 
observers that the anarchists’ effective authority in the streets could be short-lived.  Even 
when, at the end of September, the CNT agreed to the dissolution of the Anti-Fascist 
Militia Committee and its own direct participation in the Generalitat, Perkins, continued 
to see only ‘a general state of disorganization’ and a powerless Companys.29 
 
 King’s views on Companys coincided with those of the British journalist, Cedric 
Salter who found himself in Spain as the correspondent of the Daily Mail.  Salter 
regarded Companys as ‘a slick little lawyer, with a die-away chin, shifty eyes, and the 
most movingly beautiful speaking voice’ who ‘was uneasily riding the trade-unionist 
whirlwind’.   According to Salter, Companys, ‘with no qualities beyond opportunism, 
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unscrupulousness, and a capacity for appealing to the Catalan mob in its own tongue, 
found himself quite unable to arrest the rising tide of anarchy, and concentrated all his 
considerable power of adroitness and low cunning in avoiding a clash with the trade-
unionists.’  Salter’s conclusion about Companys’s relations with the CNT were somewhat 
cynical: ‘Although shrewd enough to know that the decrees that he was forced to sign 
must inevitably plunge Cataluña into speedy bankruptcy and utter chaos, he continued to 
sign on the dotted line, and so performed the valuable task of hurrying on the crisis when 
Cataluña must be taken over, lock, stock and barrel, by the Madrid Government, and so 
brought into the national war effort.’30   
 
 On the other hand, Salter was far less critical of Companys than Norman King.  
Salter had run into some difficulty in trying to arrange the escape from Barcelona on 
board a British cruiser of two nuns who had begged his assistance.  Salter’s problems 
were exacerbated by the openness with which King had expressed his contempt for 
Companys.  As he recalled: ‘I had no confidence in the consul general, who had 
repeatedly shown himself so openly hostile to the existing regime that his usefulness in 
such matters was restricted owing to the closeness with which his every movement was 
now watched.’31  King’s hostility to Companys had even gone as far as insinuations to the 
Foreign Office that the Generalitat should not be recognised as the legitimate 
government.  When, in early August, Companys had formed “Yet another government, 
composed entirely of members from the proletariat”, King had made an unusual request 
to the Foreign Office for authorisation to meet with its representatives.  Since his job was 
to liaise with the Generalitat, his request provoked consternation in London where one 
official commented: ‘Why he should ask for authority to interview their members…it 
would seem perfectly normal that he should be in touch with them.’32 
 
 Norman King’s contemptuous attitude towards Companys soon saw him in 
trouble because of a letter published on 1 September 1936 in the News Chronicle by the 
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British poet Stephen Spender.  The letter described a trip that he had made to Spain in 
March.  While in Barcelona, he had been invited to dinner by King.  Without naming 
him, Spender wrote ‘In a very short time, without inquiring about my political feelings, 
he told me in a spirit of camaraderie and with great assurance that he wished Companys, 
the constitutional president of the Catalan Republic (with whom he had a political 
relationship of international importance, second only to that of an ambassador) had been 
shot after the rising of 1934.’  King hastened to assure the Foreign Office that he was on 
the friendliest terms possible with Companys and with the family of Colonel Macià.  
Nonetheless as the lengthy subsequent correspondence showed, he believed that 
Spender’s letter had put his life in danger.33  Because of his concern, King informed 
Companys of the letter, although he did not explain to London on exactly what terms he 
had done so.  Companys, aware of the need to maintain a good relationship with Britain, 
wrote King a letter reassuring that no harm had been done to their cordial relations and 
thus closed the affair.
34
   
 
 It is worth noting that, in the course of the flurry of correspondence with his 
superiors, King did not actually deny making the offending remark and it was 
entirely in keeping with his oft-expressed views on the October 1934 events and 
their aftermath.  Indeed, he was to make the same judgement in a slightly more 
circumspect form in late November 1936.  His comments came in a report on the 
overall wartime situation made to Frank Roberts of the Western Department.   In a 
series of comments which revealed his sympathies with the military uprising, he 
commented that, after the Asturian and Catalan risings of October 1934, ‘the Rights 
treated the rebels so lightly that they were laying up fresh trouble in store for 
themselves.  Instead of dealing promptly with the prisoners, punishing the leaders 
severely and letting the rest go, they executed a very few insignificant rebels and 
imprisoned the leaders with thousands of their followers’.   The clear implication 
was that Companys, along with other Asturian and Catalan leaders, should have 
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been shot.  In some respects, King’s report was prophetic, anticipating with some 
accuracy that if Franco were victorious ‘Barcelona may expect to be the scene of a 
carnage more appalling than that witnessed by Madrid’.35 
  
 In September 1936, a visit was made to the Foreign Office in London by John 
Langdon-Davies.  A long-standing student of Catalan culture, Langdon-Davies had 
visited Barcelona as a correspondent of the News Chronicle.  His visit to the Foreign 
Office was an attempt to counter-act the apocalyptic view of Companys and of the 
Catalan situation that was emanating from right-wing sources.  A month later, he set 
down his own opinions on both as he wrote his book Behind the Spanish Barricades.  
He had come to regard Companys as ‘the greatest man in Catalunya today’ despite an 
initially very unfavourable impression: ‘I had never liked the look of him.  He is too 
much like those caricatures of the German Crown Prince that helped us to win the war to 
save democracy.  A weak man, I thought, and a sentimentalist.  I was completely wrong.  
I went to see him at his private reception room at the Generalitat. […]  Companys leaned 
back in his chair and smiled.  A foreigner who could speak to him in Catalan!  He 
relaxed.  The conversation that followed seems to me contain a statement of certain 
political truths of the first importance to any student of politics in this changing world.’   
 
 In the course of their lengthy conversation, Companys spoke of his relationship 
with the anarcho-syndicalists.  Langdon-Davies commented:  
‘Ever since the rebellion Companys has insisted in having the CNT take part in the 
responsibilities of government.  Of course, short-sighted people have thought that this 
meant that the Generalitat was become a mere shadow in the hands of the CNT.  But the 
wisdom of Companys has borne fruit.  He has tied down the anti-political philosophers to 
the job of having to organise and to govern.  If he had not vigorously supported a policy 
of making the anarcho-syndicalists responsible for what happened, they would have 
blamed the bourgeoisie for anything that went wrong; as it is they are themselves forced 
to justify their existence by learning how to keep public order; they have to control their 
own extremists.’  Langdon-Davies was equally impressed by the fact that Companys 
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seemed to have mobilised the petit bourgeoisie for the anti-fascist struggle.  He 
concluded: ‘For every thousand that has heard of Hitler and Mussolini probably only one 
has heard of Companys; but that does not alter the fact that he is one of the key-men in 
Europe today.’36 
 
 Langdon-Davies was not alone in holding a sympathetic view of Companys.  
Geoffrey Brereton, the correspondent of the New Statesman and Nation.  He described 
with admiration a scene in which Company arrived for a meeting of the Catalan 
parliament in the middle of an air-raid.  He wrote appreciatively: ‘Companys is certainly 
a brave man, and probably a strong one, but he is the direct opposite of the dictator type.  
On the contrary, he is the perfect democrat.  He charms you by his modesty and 
friendliness.  After talking to him, you are not sure which of you has enjoyed the 
conversation more.  He is a small man in the middle forties, clean shaven, with lively, 
intelligent eyes.  Whether you meet him in the middle or at the end of hard day’s work, 
he is always unruffled, refreshing in his humour, natural in his manner.  It is hard to think 
of him as the central figure in one of the stormiest decades of Catalan history.  Yet this 
unpretentious civilian has been called once to lead, twice to suppress, armed revolt.’37 
  
 The views of Langdon-Davies and Brereton were at the other end of the spectrum 
from those of conservatives like Professor Peers, who took church burnings and the 
persecution of rightists as evidence that the Generalitat was a powerless puppet in the 
hands of extremists.  He regarded Companys as complicit with those who carried out 
atrocities in the name of the anti-fascist struggle.  He saw the conflict of interest between 
the Catalan nationalist petit bourgeoisie and the revolutionary working class as a mini-
civil war held in check only by the bigger struggle against Franco.
38
   
 
 The efforts made by Companys and the Generalitat to claw back its powers from 
the revolutionary unions created considerable tension within Catalonia, although Anglo-
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Saxon diplomatic observers were less than sympathetic to the difficulties that this 
occasioned.  Massive economic and social distress was being caused by wartime 
circumstances.  The population of Barcelona had been swelled by 10% by the arrival of 
350,000 refugees.  Shortages and inflation were kept under control in the short term by 
the CNT’s supply committees which requisitioned food in the countryside and distributed 
it to the urban poor.  Inevitably, the actions of the CNT in imposing low prices led to 
peasants hoarding food.  The consequent shortages and food price inflation led to bread 
riots in Barcelona.  Companys had brought the CNT into the Generalitat at the end of 
September and re-established conventional police forces in October.  The significance of 
this was missed by the diplomats.  For King, the entry of the CNT into government was 
‘an entirely novel idea’ but not something that he saw as part of Companys’s strategy for 
bringing the anarchists under control.  The American Consul General, Mahlon Perkins, 
more perceptively, saw the new cabinet as ‘an attempt by the Government to centralize 
and strengthen its position’ although he too saw ‘little promise of success’.39   
 
 King, as always more categorical in his condemnation, was soon to be telling 
London that Companys’s new government had ‘handed themselves over, body and 
soul, to the Russian Bolshevists’.  Companys’s elimination of the POUM from the 
Generalitat on 16 December did not convince King that order was being restored.  
Indeed, he gave vent to some of his most prejudiced remarks: ‘The system which 
these people are setting up is based on robbery, arson and murder’.  He referred to 
‘the lowest, most uneducated and savage part of the proletariat, a section of whom 
now dominate by terrorism not only Barcelona, but the whole of Catalonia.’  In 
consequence, he went on to recommend that ‘a Great Power like England would act 
more in accordance with her dignity if she broke off official relations with a 
Governmnet which has fallen into the hands of communist and anarchist gunmen.’40 
    
 The American Ambassasor, Claude Bowers, was much more sympathetic to both 
the Spanish Republic and the Generalitat than his British diplomatic colleagues, although 
                                                 
39
 King to Eden, 30 September 1936, PRO FO425/413, W12877/62/41; Perkins to Hull, 29 September 
1936, Cortada, A City in War, p.28-9. 
40
 King to Howard, 21 December 1936, FO371/20567/19038/62/41. 
his personal opinion of Companys was relatively negative.  On 12 April 1937, he wrote 
to Washington from St Jean de Luz about the efforts being made to restore authority: 
‘The reports I have received from our Consul General in Barcelona indicate that progress 
is being made even there in bringing order out of chaos in Catalonia. There are now some 
reasons to believe that a Catalan army actually may enter the field to fight wherever 
needed. The strength of the extreme syndicalists and the anarchists in Barcelona has 
made the position of the Companys Government most precarious for months. One thing 
convinces me that there must be a radical change in that quarter.  I know Companys –
know him to be a timid, trimming politician without much courage of any kind; and when 
he suddenly takes the bull by the horns and comes out openly with demands for the 
unification of all forces under the authority of the Government, I know there must have 
been a change in public opinion. He is not a man who would venture much.’41 
  
 When the major fight-back against the anarchists and POUM came at the 
beginning of May 1937, Norman King was initially appalled by the street-fighting and 
commented, as he often did, on the fact that guns seemed to be available in Barcelona 
when they were lacking at the front.  The extension of the authority of the Valencia 
government caused King to comment ‘It must be irritating to the Catalan autonomists and 
independents who aimed at the creation of a national Catalan army.  The control of public 
order has also been taken over by the Valencia Government, which constitutes a 
humiliating admission of incapacity to govern by the Generality.’42  Professor Peers, not 
surprisingly, also applauded the action of the Generalitat during the May Days of 1937 
and approved of the exclusion of the CNT from the government in June.
43
  After the May 
Days, with the internal politics within Catalonia of decreasing interest to foreign 
diplomats, comments on Companys appear rarely.   
 
 In contrast with the highly opinionated reports of Norman King, it is noteworthy 
that the dispatches from the U.S. Consuls General in Barcelona and various other 
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consular agents throughout Catalonia tended more to be straight factual reports without 
strongly expressed opinions.
44
  The U.S. Consul General at Barcelona, Mahlon Perkins, 
despite his clearly conservative views, for instance, was as appalled by what he called the 
‘tyranny’ of the Francoist zone as by what he called the ‘chaos’ of the Republican zone.45  
The attitudes of King and Chilton were typical of a certain sector of the British upper 
classes who regarded foreigners with a patronising distaste.  In contrast, British and 
American observers who had devoted a long time to the study of Spanish and Catalan 
politics, even conservatives like Professor Peers, tended to be much more sympathetic.  
However, as might have been expected, sympathy or antipathy to Companys did not 
depend on the nationality of the observer in question but rather was usually the 
consequence of their prior leftist or rightist views. 
 
 This was revealed in the attitudes to Companys’s tragic end.  Few foreign 
correspondents understood Catalan aspirations more fully than Lawrence Fernsworth, a 
close friend of Henry Buckley.  He wrote of the capture and execution of Companys: ‘A 
crime which particularly shocked Europe and the liberal world was the execution at 
Barcelona's notorious Montjuich prison of Luis Companys, the former President of the 
Catalan regional government. Early in World War II he had been seized in France by the 
Nazis and handed over to Franco. And there at Montjuich on an October day in 1940 he 
met his death before a firing squad. The last words on his lips were "Visca Catalunya!"-
"Long Live Catalonia!" uttered in his native Catalan.  I had known President Companys 
during a number of years. He was one of the pioneers in the Spanish Republican 
movement. While still at the university he had been the students' Republican leader. He 
was an outstanding liberal, a friend of the underdog and he loved his Catalonia deeply. 
As head of the regional government during the Civil War he had done a magnificent job 
of keeping the government intact in the face of anarchy and chaos. He had denounced the 
militarists and their cohorts unsparingly and had incurred their unforgiving hatred. There 
was probably no man of all who had opposed Spanish fascism whom Franco could be 
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more pleased to have at his mercy.’46   The fiercely pro-Francoist, Sir Robert Hodgson, 
the British Government’s diplomatic agent in Burgos, criticised the trial and execution of 
Companys, not as intrinsically wrong but as ‘lacking in wisdom’ on the part of Franco for 
failing to perceive the political advantage of showing magnanimity.
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